Reclaiming the Daf

Yom Kippur Koton

2007-07-22T15:01:00.001-04:00

YK kotn is called thus because it's only one. For the two days of regular YK are called "one day" two, I mean: too, yummu arichtah, so to make things clear, the biblically commanded fastday before RCh is called a yummu arichtah koton.

Jewish thermodynamics, fossil fuel, and geothermal and solar energy

2005-06-28T20:07:00.000-04:00

For a couple of daf yomi weeks, we’ve read about the Jewish laws of thermodynamics. Ok, not exactly, but the Talmud faces a dilemma: every kid wants a hot lunch, but Scripture tells us not to light a fire on Shabbos. Assuming delicious cold soups had not yet been invented, what’s a balabusta to do?

<The basic problem is entropy. It’s the second law of thermodynamics. . Not as good as the first law, but we try harder. Closed systems lose heat. So, a coal or wood fire gradually burns out unless, against the shabbos laws, you keep fueling it or stoking the embers. Serving hot food for Friday night is no problem, but a hot lunch for Saturday is a challenge.

Entropy signifies the breakdown in the order of a system. Given the breakdown in my daf yomi blogging, here are notes on Chapter 2 of masechet Shabbat. Perhaps the following thoughts will coalesce into a larger commentary, or maybe you can warm up these leftovers and make something substantial. Disclosure: this was cross-posted in Quicksilver כספית.

1. Although rabbinic rules aim to prevent cooks from stoking a fire on shabbat, Rabbi Oshaya argues that such rules are not needed for hot dishes which improve as they condense. This creates a virtual definition for cholent. (bShab 37a) Turnips and meat are eligible cholent ingredients, but not figs and dates, which taste entropically worse. Some rabbis find shivelled eggs to be delicious.

2. Not all fuels are alike because some fuels, e.g. straw, do not create coals. (38b) Also, new technologies require the rabbis to formulate rules for a range of cooking ranges.

3. Solar energy cannot be used to cook eggs on the Sabbath, if it requires the heating of a derivative cooking surface, like sand or scarves (?!). (Note: Semi-hardboiled eggs may be tested by rolling, a trick I learned as a child, thank you Mom). However, it seems that a device (magnifying glass?) that concentrated the solar heat directly onto an egg would be permissible. Depending on the Jewish/Israeli demand for hard-boiled eggs on Shabbat, this may be a good opportunity for a solar energy entrepreneur. (38b-39a) Rabbinic law restricts fossil fuels yet makes a special exemption for solar energy technologies. (?)

4. Heating system entrepreneurs did come to Tiberias, where they set up hot water plumbing with the use of local hot springs. However, the sages forbade even this automated geothermal heating system because it heats up cold water in a manner analogous to manual fossil fuel methods. (39b) A similar precautionary measure (gezerah) is enacted to prohibit regular hot baths on shabbat, even with water heated previously. New geothermal technologies do not negate the overall need for investing in energy conservation on Shabbat.

5. At first, the sages forbade the use of manmade steambaths as well as bathing in the Tiberian hot springs. However, the Tiberians would not stand this injunction and kept using the springs. Therefore, the rabbis rescinded the order against use of the natural springs, but retained it against artificially heated steambaths. (bShab 40a) This incident reflects an important self-regulating principle of halakhah, which expects the rabbis not to make rulings that the people cannot abide by.

6. The talmudic analysis recognizes the net caloric difference between pouring hot water into cold and cold water into hot. (I remember that we had such problems in physics class but I forget how to solve them.) (bShab 42a) Though lacking instrumentation, the rabbis did try to measure and benchmark the points at which the target material and heat source would result in an act of cooking. (40b)

7. [For further analysis: intentionality and the principle of double effect. According to Rabbi Shimon, unless a prohibited consequence is inevitable, one could continue a permitted activity as long as the forbidden result is not intended. 41b-42a]

8. Thermodynamic properties entail variations in the capacity of materials to insulate or intensify heat. (39b) (Thankfully, this topic can be deferred for further unpolished notes on chapter three!)

Tentative hypothesis: The rabbis were aware of some basic thermodynamic properties and relationships. They differentiated between geothermal, solar and fossil fuel-based energy. They understood heat loss. However, they lacked the level of scientific knowledge and instrumentation that we have today to measure and formally conceptualize thermodynamic systems. Nevertheless, it is likely that they would have understood the greenhouse effect and global warming. Given their capacity to enact precautionary measures (gezerot), therefore, wouldn’t they have pushed for strong global warming legislation, at least* for Saturdays?

Kaspit כספית

* Joking aside, since global warming may have serious health consequences, Jewish law would not limit the necessary energy consumption restrictions to Saturdays. Perhaps the observance of Shabbat, which incidentally reduces fuel use, may inspire Jewish support and inventiveness for sound energy policy.

Amulets and health

2005-06-26T19:52:00.000-04:00

To a modern reader of Shabbat 53b, the Rabbis are dealing with a problem of correlation: Do amulets protect the health of animals? If amulets truly correlate with health, then they may be carried on Shabbat. If there is merely a spurious correlation between amulets and health, then they do not work and carrying them is (or ought to be) a form of prohibited sabbatical work.

Lacking biochemical (etc.) knowledge of sickness, the Rabbis judged the efficacy of amulets by two critera (bShab 61): medical efficacy and expertise. First, amulets are deemed effective if they cure or prevent sickness three times (3x); Second, healers are deemed experts if their amulets cure three times (3x). Wisely, the rabbis did not assume that amulets that cured humans would necessarily work with animals.* For those of us scientifically inclined, we would not expect these criteria to adequately identify effective cures. Fortunately, Jewish law here is judging the amulets only in terms of Shabbat. So the downside to an error is rather limited (esp for a shogeg). In Quicksilver כספית, this daf inspired me to blog more about the problem of mercury in vaccines, where the stakes are higher.

* Starting with the gemara at bShab 61a-b, the Talmudic liberature applies the 3x criteria with permutations involving 3 different amulets, diseases, patients, or healers.

(De-) Constructing Space

2005-06-22T10:36:00.000-04:00

In Shabbat 49b, we studied the opinion that the thirty-nine avot melakhot (categories of work on Shabbat) are derived from the Israelites' work in constructing the Tabernacle. Those forms of labor which they used are prohibited on Shabbat.
I was thinking the other day that this derivation could be greater understood using Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel's understanding of the Sabbath as a palace in time. In his book, "The Sabbath," R. Heschel writes that our weeks are filled trying to conquer space, by which he means the tangible world. We constantly attempt to acquire space, conquer it, or transform it. However, Shabbat teaches us to hold back from becoming overly focused on space and to pay attention to the sanctity of time.
This focus on time as opposed to space help us understand why the the 39 melakhot should be derived specifically from the building of the Tabernacle. The Tabernacle is the Torah's paradigmatic example of constructing space, albeit sacred space. Therefore, the activities involved in the construction of the Tabernacle are those that we refrain from on Shabbat. To quote a baraita on 49b, "they planted, thus you may not plant, they reaped, thus you may not reap." By refraining from these melakhot, we relax our grip and obsession with the realm of space and are able to focus on eternity within time.
This divestment from space is also expressed in the structure of each of the melakhot. All of the melakhot involve some form of transforming tangible objects, which R. Heschel refresh to as space. For example, cooking transforms food by cooking it, and plowing transforms a field into an area capable of planting. The one melakhah in which an object is not transformed is that of hotzaÃ¡h, carrying. (In fact, Tosafot on Shabbat 2a mentions that hotzaÃ¡h isinferioror melakhah" because it is the one melakhah in which an object is not transformed.) Yet, upon further inspection, carrying is also very much concerned with space, as it involves a significant transfer of an objecacrossss space.
These ideas can also help us understand why actions so minute as ripping toilet paper or writing should be considered "work" even though they do not seem so strenuous.
By refraining from our obsession about space, we are able to discover Shabbat's palace in time.

Three strategies for Jewish moral engagement

2005-06-10T18:00:00.000-04:00

Jewish leaders continually weigh 3 strategies for confronting economic interests with Jewish moral concerns. Praise, silence, critique.

These 3 strategies were exemplified in the daf yomi at bShab 33. Rabbi Yehudah praises the Romans for developing markets, bathhouses and bridges. He is honored by the Romans. Rabbi Yose keeps a measured silence, perhaps because dissent was persecuted. He is exiled (well, maybe put under house arrest). But R. Shimon bar Yohai harshly criticizes the Romans and the immorality behind Roman economic developments. He is hunted as a rebel. Besides a rebel, Shimon b. Yohai is also a mercurial critic of business. (He may be a deep ecology prototype. Later in the Talmudic story, he and his son attack Jewish agricultural businesses, too.) He opposes not only business as a means, but apparently business per se as a distraction from Torah study.

Since posting these words elsewhere, I’ve looked at ADDeRabbi’s fine piece, who points out that the conversation is echoed at Avodah Zarah 2a-b. There, God says “Whomever occupied himself with [Torah] may come and claim their reward.” The Romans say: “Master of the Universe, we instituted many markets, we built many bathhouses, and we increased wealth, and only for Israel, so that they may busy themselves with Torah.” God’s comeback: “Most foolish ones! All that you’ve done was for your own needs: markets to place whores there, bathhouses to rejuvenate yourselves, and all gold and silver is Mine!...they immediately left dejectedly.” As ADDeRabbi explains, this A.Z. text rejects R. Yehuda’s view while R’ Shimon view matches God’s judgment. But Shimon b. Yohai is unrealistic, too idealistic, as the bShab story shows. ADDeRabbi says: R. Shimon b. Yohai “suggests that life in exile must be lived as a protest against reality, and that any culture which is not Torah culture is worthless. R’ Yehuda, on the other hand, is willing to accept reality at face value without passing judgment. Features of the prevailing culture which further the Torah’s cause can be embraced regardless of their original intent. Indeed, he sees value in actively searching for means of accommodation and rapprochement, and in generating a modus operandi for Jewish life in an alien culture as soon as possible.”

The three Rabbis might by typed both as rhetoric (e.g., praise, critique) and as religo-political responses. They fit a pattern of Accommodation (R. Yehudah) and Resistance (R. Shimon b. Yohai). Peter Berger (The Heretical Imperative) reframes these as liberal and neo-orthodox religious responses to modernity. Meanwhile, I believe R. Yose moved to an internal exile at Tzippori, where he might be understood as taking up the strategy of Retreat.

As a side note: I'm wondering how much of R. Shimon b. Yohai's critique is aimed at the Romans. Granted, they are discussing Roman productions and the Romans certainly interpret it as a rebellious critique. But maybe he is angry with the materialist/economic culture in general. Thus, when they leave the cave, his anger is direct in an undifferentiated way, i.e. also at fellow Jews. So, though we like to see him as rebellious to Rome, perhaps he (or the gemara) intended his response as a broader critique to commercial culture?

The King/Queen is Here

2005-06-09T13:45:00.000-04:00

Toward the end of Bameh Madlikin, we read about the blowing of the shofar to alert the populace that Shabbat is arriving. In addition to functioning as an alert to cease work and prepare for Shabbat, I think we can understand it in another way. As many believe, we are better able to feel God's presence on Shabbat. The shofar blasts on Shabbat can similarly be seen in this light. One understanding of the mitzvah of shofar on Rosh Hashanah is that they are used to signal God's coronation. The shofar blasts signal that the King/Queen is being crowned. In a similar vein, the shofar can also serve as an announcement that the King/Queen is approaching. Thus, the pre-Shabbat blasts can also serve as a call to everyone who hears that God's presence is arriving with the comming of Shabbat.
This reading would explain why these blasts are mentioned in the Mishnah in Sukkah (chapter 4 if I remember correctly) along with the other shofar sounds that were blown in the temple, even though the pre-Shabbat blasts appear at first glance to have no ritual function. But, in reality, these blasts are not just in order to prevent people from working but also to alert them to God immanent arrival for the Shabbat.

Menorah: The House as Temple

2005-05-25T23:54:00.000-04:00

In studying the sugeyot in Shabbat dealing with the Hanukkah menorah, I have discovered two important motifs. The first is that of the home. On 21b, the basic mitzvah is one candle for each house. In fact, the second level of the mitzvah is a candle for each member of the household, even though it includes children who are not obligated in the mitzvah. Like few other mitzvot, the ner Hanukah must be lit in close proximity to one's home. In fact, at the bottom of 23a, a person who has two entranceways to his/her home is urged to light two candles since we are afraid that passers by might think that he/she hasn't lit the ner Hanukah near his/her home. Even more striking is the passage on 23a. R. Zeira says that when he was staying as a guest before he got married, he would chip in with his host for the ner Hanukah. The most likely explanation is that he had to chip in to be considered a member of the household. But once he got married, he did not have to chip in when he was by himself as a guest, since he could fulfill his commandment through his wife's lighting back at his home. This strongly suggests that the mitzvah of Hanukah is intimately connected with the home.
We also find the motif of the temple. At the bottom of 21a, the comparison between the ner tamid and Shabbat light is the jumping off point for the Talmud's discussion of the ner Hanukah. We also find the temple motif discussed on 21b. There, the main arguments of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai about how many lights to light for each night revolve around the temple service. Beit Shammai's argument compares the Menorah to the decreasing bull offerings during the festival of Sukkot. Beit Hillel's argument is that we should always increase matters of sanctity rather than decrease them.
In the discussion as to whether one may light a ner Hanukah from the next, the most prominent argument of the sugeya is brought from the western light of the Menorah. Even though only part of the beraita is necessary to state the intended argument, the Stam still quotes the entire text, most significantly the statement that the western light was proof that the Shekhinah dwells amidst the people of Israel.
Finally, the Menorah and the ner Hanukah posses the same midrashic link to the Torah. Just as the temple menorah is midrashically linked to Torah study, we find on 23b that one who is careful in lighting the Hanukah lights will have sons/[daughters] who are Torah scholars.
I think we can combine these motifs. Although the ner Hanukah is supposed to remind us of the miracle, it is also intended to make our homes parellel the Kodesh, in which the Menorah burned. Even though we no longer have the temple and the Menorah, we can still turn our homes into a mikdash meát, a miniature temple, and light our own Menorah.

Wax

2005-05-24T11:34:00.000-04:00

On Sunday, we read in the Mishno that we may not use שעוה to light נרות שבת. The חכמי נרבונא, quoted both by the Tosofos and by the רא"ש, in fact, ruled according to the pashtuth of the Mishno, that in fact, we may not use wax candles for נרות שבת. However, the רא"ש was מלמד זכות on those who use wax using a strange argument that went something like this: "When the Mishno said that you couldn't ue wax, it only meant to forbid the use of wax by itself. However, if you mix wax with another substance, then it is fine. And of course, if wax mixed with another substance is fine, then surely wax used alone must be fine, too."

Would anyone please stand up and defend the argument of the רא"ש? And will anyone stand up and defend the Ashkenazzi practice of using wax for נרות שבת?

Mar Gavriel

Separation

2005-05-19T22:57:00.000-04:00

Today, my friend PUG and I were discussing the extent to which religion separates its adherents from those of other religions. PUG mentioned the possibility that a religion by nature separates its believers from others, since its practicies are socially distinctive from other religions (am I quoting you right, PUG?). PUG mentioned the example of Kashrut, the laws of which practically speaking are a major social barrier between us and non-Jews. (In fact, Kashrut ends up being a social barrier between Jews. For example, the issue of would A eat in B's house if B isn't observant of many of A's stringencies.) We discussed whether this effect is the goal of Kashrut in any way.
This discussion is relevant to today's daf, 17b, which touches on our sages' prohibitions on the oil, bread, wine, and cooking of non-Jews. The Gemara states clearly that the intent of these decrees was to separate us from the gentiles. While I'd like to think that our rituals in general have no such intent, I'd like to leave this question open.
As a side question, PUG also mentioned the possibility that even if separation is not the primary intention of a religion, maybe it should not really matter, as that oftentimes ends up as its effect anyway. I personally think that intent still matters at the end of the day, but I'd like to hear anyone's thoughts.
Shabbat Shalom

Use of proper language

2005-05-19T13:45:00.000-04:00

On 15a, we have the following case:

ואידך, הלל אומר: מלא הין מים שאובים פוסלים את המקוה. שחייב אדם לומר בלשון רבו. שמאי אומר: תשעה קבין, וחכמים אומרים: לא כדברי זה ולא כדברי זה, עד שבאו שני גרדיים משער האשפה שבירושלים, והעידו משום שמעיה ואבטליון ששלשה לוגין מים שאובין פוסלים את המקוה, וקיימו חכמים את דבריהם.

The second case where הלל ושמאי disagree is regarding how much drawn water renders the מקוה unfit.

If we look at the מחלוקת, we see that they mention two different measurements, [1]הין and קב. As we continue with this piece, we see that שמעיה ואבטליון, הלל ושמאי’s teachers, also used the term לוגין. Therefore, the סתם (see bold) needs to insert the line that a person is obligated to speak in the language of his Rabbi. While הלל was using the same measurement system, it would therefore appear שמאי didn’t. However, the adage is all nice and good, but is its placement appropriate? Wouldn’t it be better at the end of the discussion, as perhaps a גופא type statement?

Ideas as to why this is needed here in this סוגיא and also as to why it is not written at the end but written right after הלל’s teaching?

[1] According to רש"י, a הין is 12 לוג.

Glass

2005-05-18T17:37:00.000-04:00

The Bavli concludes that glass is a גזירה אטו כלי חרס, not a גזירה אטו כלי מתכות. This is Rav Asshi's opinion; the other, rejected, opinion seems to have been purely made up by the Stam, as an explanation for why Rav Asshi did not say גזירה משום כלי מתכות. (Note that no Amora is named in the whole Stammaitic part of the sugya.)

Why, then, are most people today מקפיד to toivel new glass utensils that they have bought from gentiles?

Historical sense of the Stam

2005-05-17T15:16:00.000-04:00

While I have not done a careful study of this issue, I have noticed that in general, our Sages do not seem to have been so concerned about the historical development of halakha. They may say that a particular law is דאורייתא or דרבנן, but they will usually not ask: "If, in fact, law X is דרבנן, what Sages instituted it, and when?" Therefore, it is interesting that here, we find Stammaim (but apparently not Amoraim) arguing about when the י"ח גזירות were, in fact, instituted.

תנא דבי אליהו

2005-05-16T20:07:00.000-04:00

What is the meaning of the phrase תנא דבי אליהו on the bottom of 13a? I know that there is a work by this name, but we critical thinkers cannot possibly believe that this work was composed by אליהו הנביא himself. (And non-critical thinkers have no business pronouncing the name אליהו; they must say קֵלִיקָקוּ, qeyliqoqu.)

I wonder:
a) Did the ancients believe that these teachings indeed stemmed from Elijah the Prophet? If so, in what capacity could he have taught these teachings? Surely, he did not teach them in his earthly existence in the reign of King Ahab.
b) Does our story in fact appear in any of the recensions of the book תנא דבי אליהו (or סדר אליהו רבא וזוטא)?
c) There is no C, because איך ווייס נישט וואָס איז סי.

On Friday night, December 27, 2002, I had some friends over for Shabbath dinner. At this meal, this סוגיא was one of the סוגיי that we discussed. My friend NG (now Rabbi NG) pointed out: "Note Eliyyahu's not-so-great pastoral skills-- ברוך המקום שהרגו: borukh hashem that your husband died."

Visiting the Sick

2005-05-16T09:01:00.000-04:00

For those keeping up, this past שבת we read daf 12 in שבת, talking about visiting the sick. There was one line which struck me as a difficult emotionally.

ואמר רבי חנינא: בקושי התירו לנחם אבלים ולבקר חולים בשבת.

According to רבי חנינא, it was only with great difficulty that the rabbis allowed the comforting of mourners and the visiting of sick on שבת. While I understand that when it comes to the sick, we don’t request that they be healed on שבת, but how can we say that having people visit should be a difficult thing to permit? And even if we argue that the visit is a method of healing, which removes the request aspect of ביקור חולים, so how can this be so difficult to permit?

Meet your Maker

2005-05-12T14:23:00.000-04:00

From the Mishnah on Shabbat 9b onward, the sugeya discusses activities that one may not pursue during Minchah time for fear that he/she may miss it. Based on the juxtaposition of this Mishnah in Masekhet Shabbat, one can read it as applying to the issue of being ready for Shabbat, aside from the issue of praying the afternoon prayer.
The Gemara discusses how and when the prohibitions of the Mishnah would apply, and the discussion leads to a similar one concerning the evening prayer. Towards the bottom of 9b, the sugeya discusses Abaye's statement that according to the opinions that the evening prayer is voluntary, one does not have to be concerned about the evening prayer if he has already removed his girdle (did women wear girdles back then?), since he should not be obligated to put it back on in order to pray. R. Sheshet asks why the person should not just pray without the girdle. The Stam responds with a verse from Amos which means "Israel, prepare to meet your God," which, in the context of the sugeya, means that we must be dressed properly before praying. At the same time, the use of the verse suggests that God's presence is something that we must prepare for, and when we pray we are supposed to envision the presence of God before us.
I think we can read this response by the Stam as also coming to add a dimension to the previous discussion about what one may do in the afternoon as well as our interpretation of the Mishnah. While the simplest explanation of the Mishnah is that it is merely talking about Minchah, the Stam offers another aspect. The application of the verse can be telling us that we should allow time to mentally prepare ourselves for encountering God in the afternoon. Even if we are able to remove ourselves from the meal, bathhouse etc. with enough time to pray, we would still not be able to achieve the sense of mental preparation and anticipation of God's presence that is truly necessary in order to pray. While we are not expected to spend an entire hour contemplating God before praying like the early pietists (Hasidim rishonim; see the beginning of the fifth chapter of Berakhot), we are still ideally supposed to mentally prepare ourselves in some minimal fashion.
The same can be said about Shabbat as well. Since the ideal Shabbat preparation involves contemplating the special sanctity of the Shabbat, such that God is more readily apparent during this Palace in Time (to quote R. Heschel), the Mishnah is also telling us that we cannot get so bogged down in our Friday afternoon activities that we are unable to prepare to greet God's added presence that will arrive Friday evening.
Some time tonight I'll post something about the continuation of the Gemara.

עולא

2005-05-11T14:07:00.000-04:00

Hi, friends:

It has been a while since I have posted on this blog, but it is time again.

On 8a (yesterday's daf), we read:

אמר עולא: עמוד תשעה ברשות הרבים ורבים מכתפין עליו, וזרק ונח על גביו חייב

Why would `Ulla even have a hava ameina that one who threw onto such a pillar would be פטור? We have been working under the assumption that any area under 10 tefahim counts as a רשות היחיד.

The Stam explains `Ulla's statement thus:

מאי טעמא? פחות משלשה מדרס דריס ליה רבים, משלשה ועד תשעה לא מדרס דרסי ליה ולא כתופי מכתפי, תשעה ודאי מכתפין עליו

Whether or not this Stammaitic interpretation of `Ulla is correct, it is certainly a very big חִדּוּשׁ, and indeed, a very big קולא. (If I had been convinced that this had been `Ulla's original intent, I would have named this post `Ulla's qulla.) According to this קולא, only from zero to three and from nine to ten count as רשות הרבים. I wonder whether or not the Yerushalmi comes to this same qulla.

Kol Tuv,
Mar Gavriel

cd

2005-05-08T10:42:00.000-04:00

hey guys, i just want to say that i really enjoy cd.

How רבי might make a mistake.

2005-05-06T11:48:00.000-04:00

On 3b, רב חייא is said to have chastised רב for asking רבי about something he wasn’t currently involved in. The claim is that if it weren’t for רבי being a גברא רבה, a great person, he might have made a mistake and given the wrong answer.

אמר ליה רבי חייא לרב: בר פחתי! לא אמינא לך: כי קאי רבי בהא מסכתא לא תשייליה במסכתא אחריתי, דילמא לאו אדעתיה. דאי לאו דרבי גברא רבה הוא - כספתיה, דמשני לך שינויא דלאו שינויא הוא. השתא מיהת שפיר משני לך. דתניא: היה טעון אוכלין ומשקין מבעוד יום והוציאן לחוץ משחשיכה - חייב, לפי שאינו דומה לידו.

רש"י says the concern is that רבי’s heart might not be involved in the area of the question and he might be embarrassed is he was found wrong.[1] This would be an example of how the completion of the משנה by רבי didn’t the writing down of our משניות. If the tradition is oral, it makes sense why one’s specific involvement in the subject would be needed. If someone is not involved in a subject, it was not so simple as looking something up in a book. Even a great person like רבי, if his heart isn’t in it, might make a mistake.

[1] ד"ה לא תשייליה

Hadran Alach

2005-05-04T23:24:00.000-04:00

Thanks, everyone, for coming!

Ethic/social beginnings in the Mishna

2005-05-04T15:31:00.000-04:00

I’ve got to leave in a moment, but let me share the following with you right now.

Why does the Mishna begin davqa with the עני outside and the בעל הבית inside (rather than ראובן outside and שמעון inside)? Because we want to begin the Tractate with a moral/ethical issue. Similarly, Tractate Berakhoth began with the issue of is the Torah a book for rich people or a book for poor people, in other words, who is the you in the words בשכבך ובקומך: is it the עני, who dips his bread in salt at nightfall and goes straight to bed, or is it the sons of the fabulously rich Rabban Gamaliel, who come home from the bar at four in the morning?

Similarly, Dudi Goshen once pointed out that the tenth chapter of Pesahim begins (in its second sentence) ואפילו עני שבישראל לא יאכל עד שיסב, i.e. the poor should be as fancy as the rich, and ends (one mishna before the end, in what is conceptually and temporally the last mishna) אין מפטירין אחר הפסח אפיקומן, i.e. the rich should have no after-dinner revelry that any more than the poor do or can.

See you all tonight.

Spitting (a חקירה) and R. Roth on עת לעשות

2005-05-02T20:46:00.000-04:00

Two points:

1) On yesterday's daf (62b), there was a discussion of whether or not one could spit in a synagogue. At one point, the Stam was arguing that if the prohibition of spitting in the מִקְדָּשׁ was based on a קל וחמר from קפנדריא (using the area as a shortcut-path), then it should be forbidden in shul, where קפנדריא is forbidden. However, if spitting in the מִקְדָּשׁ was forbidden on the basis of a קל וחמר from wearing shoes, then it might be permitted in shul, where shoe-wearing is permitted. The Stam then quotes a barraitha in which the Tanna Qamma derives spitting from shoe-wearing, whereas R. Yosé b. Yehuda derives it from שַׂק (torn clothing). According to R. Yosé b. Yehuda, should spitting be permitted in a synagogue? He derives the prohibition of שַׂק in the Temple from the prohibition against wearing it in the royal court of the Persian Emperor, mentioned in מגילת אסתר. Thus, the question of whether or not R. Yosé b. Yehuda would allow spitting in shul depends on how we view the sanctity of the בית כנסת. If we view it as having the status of a king's court, as the Temple did, then R. Yosé b. Yehuda would forbid spitting; if we view it as having a conceptually different kind of sanctity, then he would permit spitting.

Two disclaimers:

a) This has been a חקירה, and I think that for the most part, חקירות are historically worthless. The whole barraitha was about the prohibition of spitting in the Temple, and R. Yosé b. Yehuda did not say anything about the issue of spitting in shul. Therefore, we cannot know what he would have said about the issue. However, I think that חקירות can be good as springboards for homiletical derasha, and this one can serve as good material for someone who wants to darshen in a shul on Shabbos morning about the difference between the sanctity of the Temple and the sanctity of the synagogue. Shabbath בְּהַר סִינַי, whose Torah reading contains the line את מקדשי תיראו, is coming up in two weeks; whoever wants to use my חקירה in a devar torah may do so, provided that he or she credit “Mar Gavriel from RTD” as its originator. (RTD = Reclaiming the Daf.)

b) I believe in paskening הלכה למעשה not from random Tannaitic statements preserved in a barraitha, but from the מסקנא of the Bavli. Therefore, this whole discussion about the view of R. Yosé b. Yehuda is irrelevant to me in terms of הלכה למעשה, because the last authority quoted in the סוגיא is Rava, and he is not refuted. Rava argues that spitting and shoe-wearing are permitted in shul, just as one would allow them in one’s house; however, קפנדריא is forbidden, because one would not allow it in one’s house. Rava’s view is apparently the מסקנא of the Bavli, and therefore is theoretically the הלכה. Why do I say theoretically? Because I am allowing room for the argument that today, social situations have changed, such that just as we might not tolerate spitting in our house, we should not tolerate it in shul. However, in order to make this argument, one would still need to accept the legal authority of Rava’s statement, and merely argue that because of extra-legal factors, it is no longer applicable.

2) Today’s daf, 63a, contained a discussion of the verse עת לעשות ליי הפרו תורתך. In R. Joel Roth’s book The Halakhic Process: A Systemic Analysis, on pp. 169-176, there is a discussion of the application of the principle of עת לעשות, which might be interesting to the readers of this blog.

In all your דרכים, know Him

2005-05-02T19:55:00.000-04:00

On today's דף, Berakhoth 63a, we find the following passage in the Vilna edition:

דרש בר קפרא איזוהי פרשה קטנה שכל גופי תורה תלויין בה בכל דרכיך דעהו והוא יְיַשֵּׁר ארחותיך אמר רבא אפילו לדבר עבירה

Bar Qappara darshened [homilized?]: What small scriptural passage has all the essential points of Torah hang on it? Know him in all your דרכים, and he will straighten your path. Rava said: Even in a matter of sin.

We find a little asterisk next to this statement, which leads us to a marginal note in the מסורת הש"ס. This note is in square brackets, which means, I believe, that it is from R. Akiva Eiger. (If I am wrong, please correct me.) This note reads as follows:

אמר רב פפא היינו דאמרי אינשי גנבא אפום מחתרתא רחמנא קרי כך הוא הנוסח בע"י

Rav Pappa said: this accords with the adage that people say: a burglar about to break into [a house] calls upon God. This is the reading in the ע"י.

(I assume that ע"י stands for עין יעקב.)

A few years ago, I heard an unmemorable שיעור on the thought of Rav Kook, in which this passage was cited. The speaker pointed out that this statement, which the marginal note attributes to Rav Pappa, disagrees with Rashi's comment on Rava's statement. Rashi writes:

בכל דרכיך אפילו לדבר עבירה דעהו תן לב אם צורך מצוה הוא כגון אליהו בהר הכרמל עבור עָלֶיהָ
In all your דרכים, even to commit a transgression, know him: think about it. If it is for the purpose of a mitzvah, like Eiliyyahu on Mt. Carmel, commit the transgression.

Rashi's interpretation (which is shared by the ריטב"א) applies Rava's statement only to a very special case of transgression, a transgression that is performed for the purpose of upholding mitzvah/Torah/Jewish religion. (On Mt. Carmel, אליהו offered a sacrifice on a בָּמָה, even though it was now forbidden to offer sacrifices on בָּמוֹת. He was doing this in order to perform the קדוש השם of showing that הקדוש ברוך הוא, unlike the בעל, would consume the sacrifice.) In no way are these Rishonim giving credit to a burglar or burglaress who calls upon God to bless his or her endeavor. Apparently, these Rishonim had the text that is printed in the inside of the Vilna Gemara, without the comment about the burglar.

I decided to do some manuscript work on this passage. I found that the only full manuscripts that the Lieberman database had for tractate Berakhoth were Oxford 366, Paris 371, and a Florence manuscript. The Florence manuscript is missing everything from 60a onwards, so this left only two MSS with our page. These are the readings that they had:

ברכות סג ע"א פריז 671
דרש בר קפרא אי זו פרשה קטנה שכל גופי התורה תלויין בה שנ' בכל דרכיך דעהו והוא יישר אורחותיך ואמ' רבא לא נצרכה אלא לדבר עבירה ואמ' רב היינו דאמרי אינשי גנבא על פום איגרא רחמנ' קרי

ברכות סג ע"א אוקספורד 366

דרש בר קפרא אי זו היא פרשה קטנה שכל גופי תורה תלויין בה שנא' בכל דרכיך דעהו והוא יישר אורחותיך אמ' רבא לא נצרכה אלא לדבר עבירה ואמ' רבה הינו דאמרי אינשי גנבא על פום דאיגרא רחמנא קרי

Both MSS contain the additional statement; both read איגרא (loft or roof), rather than מחתרתא; and neither attributes the statement to Rav Pappa.

For some reason, the Lieberman database does not include MS Munich 95 among its witnesses to tractate Berakhoth; therefore, I needed to check the facsimile of the manuscript (which is almost unreadable). I came up with this:

ברכות סג ע"א מינכן 95
_
דרש בר קפרא איזהו פרשה קטנה שכל גופי תלויין בה שנ' בכל דרכיך דעהו והו' יישר ארחותיך תנו רבנן אפ' לדברי עבירה

(the word that I have transcribed as גופי might also be read as גופו)

So MS Munich, like רש"י and ריטב"א, does not know of the additional statement.

So the question remains open: does the tradition recognize any potential in the religious feelings and words of a criminal, or does it condone only sinful behavior that is performed לְשֵׁם מִצְוָה? This depends on a difference of girsa in the Bavli, and on the particular perspective that we wish to take at the particular time. (Yes, NB, our desires and perspectives do count for something in religion, especially in issues of אַגַּדְתָּא.)

צניעות vs. Tzni'es

2005-05-02T13:12:00.000-04:00

The barraitha (בַּרַּיְיתָא) towards the bottom of 62a, איזהו צנוע? זה הנפנה בלילה במקום שנפנה ביום, teaches us something about a rabbinic view towards צניעות. This view considers צניעות to be the practice of the same behavior (at least with regard to one issue) in both public and private situations, both when people are looking and when people are not. Whether or not this is how we, as moderns, view צניעות, it is certainly important for us to familiarize ourselves with this rabbinic view.

Certainly, this is different from the view often found in contemporary Orthodoxy, that צניעות is only concerned with the way that women dress. In many cases, this latter view can lead to separate dress codes for public and private situations, or even to stringent dress codes for public situations combined with no rules at all in private situations. How many Orthodox women out there make sure to cover all sorts of parts of their bodies, and define צניעות in terms of inches and milimeters, while sleeping around in the privacy of יִחוּד, generally while in the status of נִדּוֹת! And how many men are equally involved in this hypocrisy, whether implicitly, as rabbis who encourage the "milimeter" view of צניעות, or explicitly, as Don Juans!

האידנא תמניא יומין לעוּמרא, דהיינו שבתא חדא ויומא חד

scatology

2005-05-02T03:37:00.000-04:00

so, my younger sisters were kind of grossed out by today's daf, and i was not so excited about it, either. i guess it's all mesorah, and, just like you can't stay with the good days, you're not stuck with the bad ones, either...

Male / female in אדם הראשון

2005-05-02T02:17:00.000-04:00

Hey, friends:

Now that the "hag that never ends" has finally ended, we are now entering "hol, glorious hol".

On 61a, we saw rabbinic discussions of the dual nature of אדם הראשון. Of course, we all know about the יצר הטוב and the יצר הרע. But it is raised in the Bavli here that there was another way in which אדם הראשון was dual: one side of him was male, and one side was female.

ויבן יי אלהים את הצלע: רב ושמואל, חד אמר פרצוף, וחד אמר זנב. בשלמא למאן דאמר פרצוף, היינו דכתיב אחור וקדם צרתני

Adonai Elohim built up the צֵלָע. Rav and Shemuel disagree about the meaning of this word. One says that it means one side/personality/image of Adam, and the other says that it means one rib of Adam. The view that it means one person[ality] of Adam makes sense, because it fits with the verse in Psalm 139, "אחור וקדם צרתני". . . .

I find this passage very interesting, not least because it recounts a myth very similar to one recounted in Plato's Symposium, 189e ff. In this passage, the character Aristophanes explains Eros (love/desire) by telling a tale that originally, people had four arms and two faces, and both male and female genitalia. (Interestingly, Aristophanes uses the word ανδρογυνος, which is the same as the rabbinic word אַנְדְּרוֹגִינוֹס, to refer to these people.) However, these people, who were very strong and mighty, insurrected against Zeus, so Zeus punished them by sending Apollo down to split the people into two halves, with genitalia on the side. Then, people would join to each other side by side, and stay in this position until one partner died, at which point the surviving partner would go find a new partner. People were thus being entirely unproductive in society. So Zeus had compassion on the humans, and switched their genitalia to the front. Now, men could fulfill their desires, and then do something productive. The girlie men would have sex with women, and then, when getting up from sex, produce babies. The macho men would have sex with other men, and then, when getting up all satisfied from sex, would do really productive things, like engage in the political life of the city. (Hey, I'm not saying this— it's Plato. And it's quite likely that Plato is being somewhat tongue-in-cheek in putting these words into the mouth of the character Aristophanes. After all, this character is based on the historical Aristophanes, who thought that politicians were the least productive members of society).

Yet I find this passage interesting also because of what it suggests about the roles of men and women in our religion. If men and women are really two פַּרְצוּפִין of one being, then how can we prevent women from learning Torah? How can men and women truly be בָּשָׂר אֶחָד if women are prevented from connected to the source of the חִיּוּת (chiyus) of our religion, the Torah itself?

Happy sefirath ha`omer,
Mar Gavriel

Dreaming of Signs

2005-04-28T18:00:00.000-04:00

I realize this post is two days late, but I felt it necessary to post something, albeit brief, about the dream sugiyot.
One persistent theme I found almost throughout is the connection between dreams and the importance of language and signs (apologies to all you semioticians out there who don't distinguish between the two).
Some schools of thought believe that thought comes before language. Meaning, people have thoughts and think of images, and language is a pale reflection of those thoughts. In the past few decades, theorists have come to believe that thoughts are framed by language, and there is thus no point in trying to get behind one's language and culture in viewing one's "true" thoughts, because ha beha taliya, one's ideas cannot be separated from language and context.
Our sages in the sugya on dreams seem to take this second view of signs and language. Frequently in the sugya, images are interpreted using verses in the Bible, suggesting that both donkeys and biblical texts are interchangeble. Both are signs, and thus the image of the ox can easily be interpreted using another verse that mentions oxen.
Similarly, interpretations of dream can be interpreted not only based on the object itself, but also the Hebrew name for the image. In fact, in one spot, we are told that when one views a can in a dream, its interpretation can depend on whether one pronounces its Aramaic form as Shinra or Shunra. Language and image become intertwined.
On 55b, R. Yonatan states that a person is only shown products of his/her own thoughts. Rava proves this by noting that people never see a palm tree of gold in their dreams because they never think about such images. These passages suggest that even if dreams are divinely influenced, they can never be detached from language and culture.
I think the most apt metaphor for a dream in rabbinic thought would be a text. Dreams, like texts, can be interpreted in different ways, and their meanings end up following their interpretations, rather than having an "objective meaning. Even the image guide mentioned later in the sugeya (like about someone who dreams about barley, etc.) can be seen as instructions about how to view a dream positively. (This would explain why that passage even views a death as a positive dream.) As in Torah sheba'al peh, the mouth ends up as the prime interpreter of the text, which explains the literal meaning of the statement that dreams follow the "mouth."
Like texts, dreams can be interpreted differently based on the different intertexts (parallel texts) that they are compared to. This explains why, towards the beginning of the dream sugeyot, the Gemara gives advice for what one should do after seeing various images in a dream. For example, if one sees a river in a dream, he/she should recite (notice the verbal aspect) a verse with a positive mention of a river before he/she thinks of a verse with a negative mention of a river. One must interpret the dream positively by relating it to a positive intertext, pushing the dream in a positive direction.
This comparison would explain why meanings of a dream can be flexible, even if they can be prophetic. Heaven gives us the text, it is our job to interpret it and make the best of it.
Hag Sameah.

Dream correspondences

2005-04-28T14:59:00.000-04:00

On Berakhoth 57a-b (among the דפים in the Bavli that are highest in word-density per page), there is a long list of dream-correspondences. If you see X, this means X' (“X-prime”). If you see Y, this means Y'. If you see Z, this means Z', but Rabbi A says that it means Z'' (“Z double-prime”).

To us people who are doing סוּפֶּר־בְּקִיאוּת (or should I spell that as סוּפֶּר־בְּקִיאוּס, in order to make the sound clear to non-speakers of Ashkenazzis?), this section is quite tedious. It merely consists of apodictic statement after apodictic statment, with almost no שַׁקְלָא וְטַרְיָא, and almost no connection between one statement and the next. (For those of you who don't know, apodictic is the term used by מַרָּנָא וְרַבָּנָא דָּוִד חִוָּרָא-- who is known in Hebrew as מוֹרֵנוּ וְרַבֵּנוּ דָּוִד הַלִּבְנִי, and in English as our teacher and master David Weiss-- to refer to short, assertative statements, which do not involve פֵּירוּשׁ or שַׁקְלָא וְטַרְיָא.)

Yet I think that there is a fair amount of literary structure in this סוּגְיָא (if, indeed, it merits the name סוּגְיָא). I don't have time to analyze the literary structure right now, because we are doing סוּפֶּר־בְּקִיאוּת (also known as Daf Yomi), and 57 was already two days ago. Let me just point out the following points:

1) At least two items on the list are related to holidays: shofar (two-thirds of the way down on 56b) and lulav (two-thirds of the way down on 57a); we also have שְׂעוֹרִים (barley, related to Nisan 16, יוֹם הֶנֶף, the day when ספירת העומר starts), and חִטִּים (wheat, related to the שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם offered on Shavu`oth, the day when ספירת העומר ends), and each of these two species can be made into מַצָּה, a food that is related to the festivals of פֶּסַח and חַג הַמַּצּוֹת. And olive oil (שֶׁמֶן זַיִת) is related to Hanukka. Is there any literary connection between the symbolism associated with these various holidays?

I find it interesting that if one sees barley in one's dream, it means that one's sins are forgiven. Isn't barley considered by the rabbis to be מַאֲכַל בְּהֵמָה? I am reminded of the famous derasha that on Passover, we are like animals, who have just been taken out of captivity. Therefore, we offer barley on Nisan 16. Our sins are forgiven at this point. Yet we must still go through the refining process of ספירת העומר, during which we better ourselves, and God feeds us with manna (מָן), until we can become true human beings. Then, when the refinement process is over, we become human beings, and we offer the שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם, made of wheat-- wheat made into hametz, no less-- on Shavu`oth. At this point, we receive the Torah. And the Torah is associated with שלום, so perhaps it is appropriate that wheat in dreams symbolizes שלום.

וְיָשֵׂם-- וְיָשֵׂם
לְךָ-- לְךָ
שָׁלוֹם-- אַיי יַי יַי יַי יַי יַי יַי יַי יַי שָׁלוֹם

(And if you had a disturbing dream last night, you can say the special רבונו של עולם prayer, found on 55b, during the aye yay yay yay yay. But I couldn't do that this morning, because I was the שליח צבור, leading the priest in the ritual. Why did we dukhen at Shtein this morning? Because we followed the pesaq that one should dukhen on חול המועד.)

Kalmin on Rav Shesheth

2005-04-28T12:44:00.000-04:00

Pieces of notes from Prof. Kalmin's שיעור, in which he dealt with the story of Rav Shesheth and the מין.

Yonah Fraenkel. “Bible Verses in the Tales of the Sages”, Scripta Hierosolymitana 22 (1971). pp. 80 ff.

I. Thesis: Quotations from Scripture placed in the mouths of aggadic figures are intrinsic parts of the story, and they show “that the sages perform all their work with absolute confidence, that all their endeavors are directed toward truth, and that the source of the spiritual power of their actions derives from the Bible. (99)

IV. Rav Shesheth and the min (Berakhoth 58a):
a. Conspicuous external phenomena do not accompany the king, because he derives his sovereignty from God; therefore, the king’s arrival will be like God’s arrival.
b. How do we know the manner of God’s arrival? From Scripture, of course: צא ועמדת בהר לפני ה' והנה ה' עובר ורוח גדולה וחזק מפרק הרים ומשבר סלעים לפני ה' לא ברוח ה' ואחר הרוח רעש לא ברעש ה' ואחר הרעש אש לא באש ה' ואחר האש קול דממה דקה (I Kings 19:11 f.).
c. The min denies the connection between the heavenly and earthly worlds. His punishment is that he is annihilated.

What does this story mean?
•The correct reading in this story is not מינא, but מינא בר־בי־רב (certainly not צדוקי!) The expression "מינא בר־בי־רב" is unparalleled, and seems to mean something like “a heretic Rabbi”.
•Rav Shesheth is the archetypical Babylonian blind sage. What is he doing talking with a min? We never elsewhere find a Babylonian Amora speaking to a min. (In one place, we find a sage named רבא speaking with a min, but רבא could be a Palestinian רבי אבא.)
•Because this story involves a min, and because it uses the expression "גל של עצמות", Kalmin argues that it was originally a Palestinian story. When it reached Babylonia, Babylonians plugged in the name of Rav Shesheth, the archetypical Babylonian sage. However, it was strange for a Babylonian sage to be talking to a min, so the min became a "מינא בר־בי־רב" (“heretic / rabbi”).
•Kalmin says: This story, too expresses rabbinic anxiety. The issue around which this story revolves is who has the ability to interpret reality? The min has the senses of sight and hearing, whereas the rabbi has only the sense of hearing. However, the rabbi has scripture, which the min does not, so only the rabbi has the ability to interpret reality.
•Kalmin reads this story as an allegory: The rabbi, who is blind, represents the Jews, who are physically powerless. The min, who has sight, represents the gentiles, who have power. However, only the Jews have scripture, which gives them the ability to perceive the king, who represents either הקדוש־ברוך־הוא or the Messiah. (If the king represents the Messiah, then the story could be an anti-Christian polemic. The Christians say: “Look, the king has come already.” The Jews respond: “No, we know more than you, because we have scripture. The king is not here yet.”)
*The religious polemics with gentiles with regard to how to interpret reality were a great source of anxiety for the rabbis.
•If we emphasize the fact that the min is a מינא בר־בי־רב, the story represents the power (or lack thereof) of rabbis over other people in the rabbinic movement. This, too, was very anxiety-provoking.

rtd/cd siyyum on brachot?

2005-04-28T01:07:00.000-04:00

rabosai, how about a rtd/cd siyyum in my apartment (roommates permitting)?

Bibliography on Dreams

2005-04-27T23:04:00.000-04:00

We daffers are currently in the middle of what Prof. Avraham Weiss ז"ל called "מסכת החלומות". The equivalent passage in the Yerushalmi is in מעשר שני, פרק ד הלכה ו. Perhaps some ReclaimingTheDaffers would be interested in reading some of the articles that modern חוֹקְרִים have written on the topic of these “dream-books”.

A quick search on RAMBI for “Talmud AND dreams” yielded the following results. I have not had a chance to actually see any of these articles, so I cannot vouch for their quality. However, I have heard Prof. Richard Kalmin (author of article #3 on the list) lecture on the topic, and I can assure you that his lecture was interesting.
(Kalmin argued that in ארץ ישראל, the land of the Yerushalmi, it was acceptable for rabbis to interpret dreams, whereas in Babylonia, this was not considered appropriate. This is why the Bavli hates Bar Haddaya so much. Part of the reason that the Babylonian rabbis, both Amoraim and Stammaim, wrote so many dream “translations” into this מסכת חלומות was that they wanted to put people like Bar Haddaya out of business.)

1. Alexander, Philip S. Bavli. “Berakhot 55a-57b; the talmudic dreambook in context.” Journal of Jewish Studies 46 (1995). 230-248

2. Spero, Moshe Halevi. “Dream psychology in talmudic thought.” PAOJS 3-4 (1976). 123-132

3. Kalmin, Richard Lee. “Dreams and dream interpreters.” Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors in Rabbinic Babylonia (1994). 61-80

4. Neusner, Jacob. “In the view of rabbinic Judaism, what, exactly, ended with prophecy?” Mediators of the Divine (1998). 45-60

5. Koet, Bart Jan. “ ‘Sag lieber, dass er diesen Traum positiv deuten soll’; über die Traumdeutung nach einem rabbinischen Traumbuch (Babylonischer Talmud Berachot 55-57).” Kirche und Israel 17,2 (2002). 133-149

6. Ulmer, Rivka. “The semiotics of the dream sequence in Talmud Yerushalmi Ma`aser Sheni.” Henoch 23,2-3 (2001). 305-323

Greater the one who answers than the one who blesses:

2005-04-27T16:28:00.000-04:00

On 53b, we have the following:

והתניא, רבי יוסי אומר: גדול העונה אמן יותר מן המברך! אמר ליה רבי נהוראי: השמים! כן הוא; תדע, שהרי גוליירין יורדין ומתגרין במלחמה וגבורים יורדין ומנצחין.

One who answers a blessing is comparing to a seasoned warrior who gets the credit for the victory. Knowing that there is שומע כעונה, that one says a ברכה for the whole, I wonder about the one who is the person saying the ברכה. Shouldn’t that one person be praised for being the one taking the lead?

sweet dreams are made of this...

2005-04-26T08:44:00.000-04:00

daf dream interpretation is just not doing it for me.

חג שמח

2005-04-21T18:26:00.000-04:00

I would also like to wish all my fellow writers and those who read this blog a happy and kosher Passover. May all your preparations be filled with שלום בית and may your פסח סדר be meaningful.

Go Yalta!!

2005-04-21T17:34:00.000-04:00

In the Talmud, its very tough finding proto-feminist heroes, but in yesterday's daf we find a story that can be interpreted (or reinterpreted?) as challenging the dominant patriarchy. After being denied the ability to drink from a kos shel berakhah because she is told by her husband Ulla that a baby receives blessing only from the father and not from the mother, she breaks many barrels of wine. When Ulla tries to condescendingly placate her, she refuses to be appeased.
I think its possible to read Yalta as reacting to the assumption that women can only be blessed through child bearing, compounded by the assumption that this blessing itself is not due to their own merits. Similarly, she finds Ulla condescending when he tries to pretend that another barrel of wine is just like a kos shel berakhah.
I realize that it's right before Pesach (and my wife and I have a lot of cooking and cleaning to do together), but I'd like some more reactions about how they read the narrative. Also, I'm sure some Talmudist must have written an article discussing this narrative. Any bibliographical info would also be helpful.
Hag Sameah.

חג שמח

2005-04-21T11:06:00.000-04:00

Hi, people.

I'm way too tired to write anything substantive right now, because I'm busy preparing for יום טוב, but I wanted to wish everyone on Reclaiming the Daf a happy festival.

Mar Gavriel

Chazering with the רי"ף

2005-04-19T14:29:00.000-04:00

When one learns דַּף יוֹמִי, it is very easy to forget the material. However, most of us do not have enough time to chazer the whole daf after lerning it.

I have found over the last few days that it can be very useful to chazer by read through the רי"ף's summary of the סוּגְיֵי on the דַּף. Has anyone else found this to be helpful?

Mar Gavriel

The offensive nature of defining an עם הארץ

2005-04-17T20:10:00.000-04:00

:ברכות מ"ז provides a list of what qualifies one to be considered an עם הארץ.

תנו רבנן: איזהו עם הארץ? כל שאינו קורא קריאת שמע ערבית ושחרית, דברי רבי אליעזר, רבי יהושע אומר: כל שאינו מניח תפילין, בן עזאי אומר: כל שאין לו ציצית בבגדו, רבי נתן אומר: כל שאין מזוזה על פתחו, רבי נתן בר יוסף אומר: כל שיש לו בנים ואינו מגדלם לתלמוד תורה, אחרים אומרים: אפילו קרא ושנה ולא שמש תלמידי חכמים הרי זה עם הארץ. אמר רב הונא: הלכה כאחרים.

1. רבי אליעזר says it is a person who doesn’t recite שמע in the evening and in the morning
2. רבי יהושע says it is one who doesn’t wear תפילין
3. בן עזאי says one who doesn’t put ציצית on one’s clothing.
4. רבי נתן says an עם הארץ is one who doesn’t put a מזוזה up on the doorpost.
5. רבי נתן בר יוסף says it is one who has sons and doesn’t raise them with a Jewish education (my modern turn of phrase)
6. אחרים says it is the whole list and also includes one who might have knowledge of the sources but is not משמש תלמידי חכמים.

I find this whole list difficult, except מזוזה, because the first three are מצוות עשה שזמן גרמה, and the rest are about תלמוד תורה. This means, that at some level, women were almost automatically classified as עמי הארץ in the time of חז"ל [and even for many, until today]. Perhaps this might also be another explanation for the omission of women in the discussion of women and מנין, because they are automatically ruled out as part of the category of עם הארץ and not merely because of פריצותא.

A disturbing halakha? No, actually not.

2005-04-17T18:51:00.000-04:00

I love the halakhic system, because it is so beautiful and symmetrical. Yet I find very ugly and asymmetrical the idea that a child can be counted for a זימון, yet a woman cannot. Especially disturbing is the view that even a young child שיודע למי מברכין can be counted. In fact, the רא"ה says that one can even count a five-year-old child.

The רא"ה says that the reason that we don't count women in a men's זימון is פריצותא.

Oh, wait: I forgot. Women have an obligation to make their own זימון. Presumably, a young girl שיודעת למי מברכין could count in a women's זימון, just as a young boy שיודע למי מברכין can count in a men's זימון.

Prominence

2005-04-17T18:35:00.000-04:00

I see that our blog has become prominent enough to receive comments by people who apparently have no interest in Talmud or religion.

Keith Pfeffer, http://www.keithpeffer.com, recently posted the following strange response to one of my postings on women and zimmun:

Comrade Chairman! I must protest! The woman is an enemy of the state - and the daughter of an enemy to the state.

Strange.

Shiltei Haggibborim on צֵירוּף

2005-04-17T15:08:00.000-04:00

Joshua Bo`az mi-Beith Barukh, the guy who put the עין משפט - נר מצוה on the page of the Gemara, also wrote a commentary on the רי"ף known as שלטי הגבורים (printed on the outside margin of the רי"ף pages in the back of the Vilna ש"ס.)

I wish to share a fascinating text from the שלטי הגבורים with you.

On 33a of the רי"ף pages, note ב, the שלטי הגבורים writes:

ר"ת ורבינו שמחה כתבו דאשה ועבד מצטרפין לזימון עשרה ורוב הפוסקים נחלקו עליהם ולדברי רבינו יהודה מצטרפין לג' ואי חמיר עשרה יותר מג' כמו שכתב ר"י נמצא דמ"ד דמצטרפין לשלשה ומה שיש להקשות על דברי רבינו יהודה כתבתי בספר המחלוקות בס"ד ונשים י"א דהרשות בידן לזמן בג' אם ירצו והרא"ש הוכיח דעם האנשים חובה ומיימוני כתב סתם דמזמנות לעצמן אבל לא יזמנו בשם והרא"ש כתב דמצטרפות עם האנשים לזימון בשם ור"י הכהן היה עושה הלכה למעשה להצטרף נשים לזימון ומהר"ם פליג עליו מיהו לכולי עלמא יוצאות בזימון האנשים אלא דפליגי אם צריכות שיבינו לשון הקדש או לאו יש אומרים דצריכות להבין אותו לשון ויש אומרים דאינו צריך והכי נמי פליגי בסופר מברך ובור יוצא אם צריך שיבין לשון הקדש או לאו.

1) What does דמ"ד stand for? דְּמִתּוֹךְ דָּא, perhaps?

2) What does the phrase והרא"ש הוכיח דעם האנשים חובה mean?

3) Who was רבינו יהודה?

4) Is it not an interesting historical note that Rabbenu Yehuda (whoever he was) actually counted women בצירוף with men?

By the way, on Friday I think that I mentioned a certain friend of mine who always says that the line הכל מחוייבין בשימון לאתויי נשים לענין רשות קאמר in Tosofos on 45b is the most preposterous and destructive line in halakhic literature. (This fellow despises Tosofos.) I spent Shabbos with this friend, and tried to convince him that the Tosofos have a plausible read (albeit one that I do not like, because it goes against my political agenda, which is to emphasize ways in which halakha is egalitarian). But he would hear none of this.

More on Women and Minyan

2005-04-17T14:42:00.000-04:00

In a discussion which spills over from the bottom of yesterday's daf (47) onto today's (48), the Bavli deals with whether nine men + X can count in a minyan (either for זימון בשם, i.e. zimmun including God's name Eloheinu, or for תפילה). There are various suggested Xs: an ארון (presumably a synagogal ark containing Torah scrolls, not just any old closet), a slave, a child, and (strangest of all) the Sabbath. (Some of these are suggested in the context of minyan, and some in the context of a three-person zimmun.)

Interestingly, the idea that nine men + one woman could count as a minyan is not raised. I have three possible explanations for this:

1) Women are so unimportant in the eyes of the Sages that is is obvious that a woman can't count as the tenth in a minyan.
............1a) קושיא on this interpretation: See מנחות מג: - מד, where we find the statment that עבד זיל טפי, a slave is even lower than a woman.

2) Women do, in fact, count in the minyan לכתחילה, and therefore, there is no need to ask whether a woman can count as the tenth member of the minyan.

...........2a) קושיא on this interpretation: what, then, does מאה נשי כתרי דמיין mean? Didn’t the Tosofos on 45b explain it as being לענין קבוץ תפילה ולענין כל דבר שבעשרה?

.........................2c) תירוץ: The statement מאה נשי כתרי דמיין could be not a statment of halakha, but a statement of the social reality of the time of חז"ל: women don't have חשיבותא. (I heard this from my friend NG, who based in on the ריטב"א. Yet he still won't count women in zimmun or minyan!)

3) Theoretically, women could count in the minyan, but we don't allow them to, because of פריצותא.

.................3a) That's the stupidest thing that you have said so far! If this were the case, the Bavli would have brought up the הוה אמינא that a woman could be counted. We would have expected something like ואימא אתתא! שאני אתתא, דמשום פריצותא לא מצטרפא.

Ultimately, the answer is: I don't know. I currently do not count women in the minyan לכתחילה, but בשעת הדחק, I will davven at WLSS (Women's League Seminary Synagoge), and respond to דברים שבקדושה.

I should now like to open the floor to discussion . . . !

By the way, how did Fresh Samantha's community blog שיעור go yesterday?

3 "proofs" for HaTov V'HaMeitiv being non-biblical

2005-04-17T13:32:00.000-04:00

Every time we bentsch, we say four blessings. The first three are “biblical (though the מדרש if I recall does attribute the second and third ברכות to non-תורה figures, namely יהושע and דוד).” The fourth, according to a few places so far in the 6th and 7th פרקים, is not biblical. On :ברכות מ"ו.- מ"ו, the גמרא presents three Amoraic “proofs” for the non-biblical aspect of הטוב והמטיב.

אמר רב יוסף: תדע דהטוב והמטיב לאו דאורייתא - שהרי פועלים עוקרים אותה. אמר רב יצחק בר שמואל בר מרתא משמיה דרב: תדע דהטוב והמטיב לאו דאורייתא - שהרי פותח בה בברוך ואין חותם בה בברוך. כדתניא: כל הברכות כולן פותח בהן בברוך וחותם בהן בברוך חוץ מברכת הפירות, וברכת המצוות, וברכה הסמוכה לחברתה, וברכה אחרונה שבקריאת שמע; יש מהן שפותח בהן בברוך ואין חותם בברוך, ויש מהן שחותם בהן בברוך ואין פותח בברוך. והטוב והמטיב פותח בברוך ואין חותם בברוך, מכלל דברכה בפני עצמה היא. ואמר רב נחמן בר יצחק: תדע דהטוב והמטיב לאו דאורייתא - שהרי עוקרין אותה בבית האבל. כדתניא: מה הם אומרים בבית האבל? ברוך הטוב והמטיב; רבי עקיבא אומר: ברוך דיין האמת

The first proof is, according to רב יוסף, that workers may fulfill the requirement for ברכת המזון without including the 4th ברכה. The second proof is that הטוב והמטיב begins with a ברכה but doesn’t end with one. After the סתם includes a digression to quote for us the nature of ברכות, namely that all except certain cases have a ברכה פתיחה and a ברכה חתימה, it then provides a third proof, that הטוב והמטיב is not said in a בית אבל.

I have a few questions about this piece:

1. Does הטוב והמטיב not having an end ברכה prove it is not biblical, or is that proof merely as a result of it being compared with the ברכת המזון?
2. Is the ability to uproot the ברכה proof that it is not biblical or is that the result, the פסק, because it is not biblical?
3. Isn’t it obvious that הטוב והמטיב shouldn’t have a biblical status if the attribution of the ברכה is ביתר, which would place this ברכה post אנשי כנסת הגדולה, the group seen as the final arbiter regarding תפילה and ברכות?
4. Who else thinks the symmetry of רבי עקיבא to the discussion of הטוב והמטיב is somewhat interesting? If הטוב והמטיב is attributed to the fall of ביתר, then perhaps this might open up a new way to understand why רבי עקיבא says דיין אמת in a בית אבל.

Zimun

2005-04-15T16:04:00.000-04:00

Responding to Mar Gavriel's question: I don't say changing our practice as "getting rid of" the halakhah. Rather, I see it as a different interpretation that we hold due to changes in how we view women. The assumption made by the Stam is that women are only (at best) two-thirds of a man (it's a little too tempting to recall the three-fifths compromise). In our day, when we assume that women are equal to men (in what way, I'll leave to a machloket between second and third wave feminism), women have an obligation to make a mezumenet.
Robert Cover, in his article "Nomos and Narrative," argues that law cannot be divorced from assumptions, hopes dreams, philosophies, etc. which we refers to as "narrative." I therefore find it difficult interpret the halakhah as zimun only being a reshut for women when Tosafot's reading is premised upon the belief that women are only two-thirds of a man.
I'd like to hear from anyone else who has read the Robert Cover article how they would apply it to our case.

Women, Zimmun, and Minyan

2005-04-15T13:31:00.000-04:00

Women, Zimmun, and Minyan

(the title of this posting almost rhymes: wimmin, zimmin, and minyin)

Yesterday, we saw a whole discussion in the סתם concerning whether or not two people (presumably men) may do זִמּוּן as a רְשׁוּת (non-obligatory action). One of the pieces of evidence adduced was the following בָּרַיְיתָא:

נשים מזמנות לעצמן ועבדים מזמנות לעצמן; נשים ועבדים וקטנים אם רצו לזמן אין מזמנין

The assumption is that this proves that a group of two men may perdorm זִמּוּן, because, as the Stam explains,

והא מאה נשי כתרי גברי דמיין
One hundred women are equivalent to two men.

What does this mean-- equivalent in what way? Surely, I would not say that in terms of intellectual potential, potential for חסד, potential earning power, or any other potential, any two men are as “good” as one hundred women.

Let’s look at Rishonic explanations. Rashi comments:

דאפילו מאה כתרי דמיין לענין חובה, דאין חייבות לזמן, ואם רצו מזמנין

Rashi explains this in terms of obligation. Women are not obligated to do זימון, and therefore, 100 women have the same level of obligation to do זימון as two men do. Nevertheless, just as 100 women may choose to do זימון, so may two men.

(Remember, this is all within the הוה אמינא. The Gemara rejects the idea that two men may choose to do זימון, because שאני התם דאיכא דעות, the case of three women is different from that of two men, because when three women are present, there are three different דֵּעוֹת, independent personalities.)

Yet Rashi seems to be ignoring (or perhaps rejecting) the סוגיא in Tractate ערכין, which says that women are מחוייבות בזימון. I have not actually seen this other סוגיא, but I have seen it alluded to in Tosafos, and I have heard friends talk about it. If, in fact, the two סוּגְיֵי are not mutually contradictory, what can the statement מאה כתרי דמיין in our סוגיא mean?

Tosofos write:
והא מאה נשי כתרי גברי דמיין לענין קבוץ תפילה ולענין כל דבר שבעשרה, ואפילו הכי חשבינן להו כשלשה , והוא הדין לשנים.
In other words, even 100 women count only as two men in terms of a מנין for prayer. (So, does that mean that if ten men can form a מנין, five hundred women can do so, as well? I'm not being tongue-in-cheek. Perhaps this is a real possibility.)

But whence do the Tosafists derive this idea that women can't count in a מנין? Does anyone know where in the Bavli the idea of דברים שבעשרה is discussed in depth? I seem to remember that there is something about it in Tractate מגילה, but I haven't looked at that tractate in many years.

How does this fit into lia’s (or was it mivami’s) idea of getting rid of מנהגים or הלכות that don’t fit with our current conceptions of what is right?

גּוּט שַׁבָּת לְכֻלְּכוֹן,
Mar Gavriel

You Are What You Eat

2005-04-14T21:48:00.000-04:00

Responding to Bryan's question: Even if current nutritional science proves Hazal's advice incorrect, we can still derive an important message for our own day. I read their statement about meat restoring life and other similar statements as telling us that we are and become what we eat. Berakhot has taught us so far that eating is not just something we do to satiate ourselves, but rather affects how we live the rest of our lives. The nutrition advice from Berakhot is an imaginative function of this belief, but still a true one in its own way.

“Woe to the house that has vegetables passing through it”

2005-04-14T17:03:00.000-04:00

Disclaimer: My reading of the text is not a personal attack on anyone’s particular eating habits. I am just reporting some of my musings on an aspect of yesterday’s דף.

אוי לו לבית שהלפת עוברת בתוכו. איני? והא אמר ליה רבא לשמעיה: כי חזית לפתא בשוקא - לא תימא לי: במאי כרכת ריפתא! אמר אביי: מבלי בשר; ורבא אמר: מבלי יין. איתמר, רב אמר: מבלי בשר; ושמואל אמר: מבלי עצים; ורבי יוחנן אמר: מבלי יין.

On :ברכות מ"ד, the סתם expounds on a series of warnings about food consumption. Among the list is the idea that a house with vegetables passing through should be concerned. When I first looked at this text, I felt the סתם was presenting the culmination of some form of warning against vegetarianism. There is discussion of the ill effects of eating raw vegetables and not completely grown foods. Furthermore, the גמרא also discusses the positive powers of eating meat and fish. The גמרא sees a sympathetic effect of eating נפש providing a renewed vitality in a person. The discussion then leads into this last piece, where people are warned about having a house without alternatives to vegetables, be it meat, wine or even a better cooking system.

I leave this open to debate as another situation, ala the תלמיד חכם, of a difficult non-halachic statement from the גמרא. Can we figure out if there is any means of including statements of this nature in our lives? Or should we say, ‘that’s an interesting perspective… lets move on?”

The Nose Knows

2005-04-14T01:22:00.000-04:00

In yesterday's daf, 43b, discusses the blessing we make on aromas. The proof for the necessity of making a berakhah on aromas comes from kol haneshamah tehalel kah, every soul shall praise God. R. Zutra's proof from this verse is: what is something that soul but not the body derives benefit from? We must say that it refers to the sense of smell. This proof assumes that the sense of smell connects to the soul more than any of the other five senses.
I was bothered by why the sense of smell should be considered any less physical than the other senses. Even if the nose does not perceive anything tangible, I was still perplexed as to why an aroma should be considered any less physical than soundwaves, which are also intangible.
I was thinking that the difference might lie in how difficult it is to create aroma vs. sound. Sound can be created through mere speech. Sound can therefore be converted more easily than smell. It is easier to change the sound that one makes than to change one's odor. The smell of an object reflects more about the inherent nature of something than the sound it makes. Therefore, we can say that smelling something connects someone to its intangible essence, which can therefore only be done by the soul.
This might also be expressed in the continuation of the sugeya, which says that in the future the young men of Israel will smell like the Lebanon forest, suggesting that their pleasant smell will reflect their beautiful natures.
Unfortunately, I don't have Maharal's Hiddushei Aggadah in the house, so I can't check to see if the Maharal says anything like this. If anyone can check that would be great.
Any alternative readings of these passages would be appreciated.

May a talmid hakham speak with a woman in public?

2005-04-13T12:03:00.000-04:00

In yesterday’s daf, 43b, we read that there are six activities that are disgraceful (גנאי) for a תלמיד חכם. One of them was ואל יספר עם האשה בשוק. How should we deal with this in terms of הלכה למעשה (or possibly מוסר למעשה) today? Note that in order to simplify the issue, I am leaving out of consideration the fact that we have female תלמידות חכמים and even תלמידות חכמות today; if any of you has thoughts from an angle that considers this fact, please put up a comment on this posting.

1) My first thought for a קולא was that perhaps the verb לספר refers only to flirting. However, even if this is a correct interpretation of the original ברייתא, we cannot use this as הלכה למעשה, because Rav Hisda (supported by the possibly fictitious ברייתא) says that this applies even to one’s sister, daughter, or wife, with whom one cerainly would not be flirting.

2) My second thought was that גנאי לו does not imply an actual prohibition. Rather, this is merely a list of behaviors that חז"ל (sorry to be so vague) considered inappropriate, in their social context, for the dignity of a תלמיד חכם. Perhaps, we can learn from this that תלמידי חכמים today should not perform behaviors that are undignified in their own social contexts. In a chareidi social context, for example, a תלמיד חכם should probably not speak with a woman on the street (nor should he surf the internet, lest he be perceived as looking at pornography). What would be the corresponding inappropriate actions for תלמידי חכמים in “our” society?

[I put “our” in quotation marks, because this site is meant for people who are in many different societies. Yet as far as I know, all the people who are currently posting on this site are from the same Liberal Orthodox or Highly Traditional Conservative Jewish society, which [at least up here on the UWS] are largely the same society.

3) How far do we take this idea of changing social expectations. We would probably agree that we can apply it to statements of מוסר made by חז"ל, but can we apply it to statements of הלכה made by חז"ל. Or statements of מוסר or הלכה made by the Torah itself? At JTS, there is a raging debate about the permissibility (or not) of משכב זכר.

From the halakhic comments that I have made on this blog so far, I think that most of you know where I stand in terms of the continued binding nature of halakha. But not everyone has the same opinions that I do.

And in any event, it is often very difficult to determine whether a particular line is הלכה or מוסר? Did חז"ל even have a concept that they were different? Did the Torah?

Discussion, anyone?

Excuses, Excuses

2005-04-12T23:03:00.000-04:00

רב פפא איקלע לבי רב הונא בריה דרב איקא, אייתו לקמייהו שמן והדס, שקל רב פפא בריך אהדס ברישא והדר בריך אשמן. אמר ליה: לא סבר לה מר הלכה כדברי המכריע? - אמר ליה, הכי אמר רבא: הלכה כבית הלל. ולא היא, לאשתמוטי נפשיה הוא דעבד

On :ברכות מ"ג, the גמרא mentions an encounter between רב פפא and רב הונא the son of רב איקא. After proving that one follows the opinion of בית שמאי regarding the order of ברכות for smelling oil and myrtle brought to the table at the same time, the סתם relates that רב פפא does not follow the opinion of בית שמאי and blesses the הדס before the שמן. The גמרא then says that רב פפא responded by quoting רבא who says we follow the opinion of בית הלל. The סתם then concludes that רב פפא was merely making an excuse for his actions.

What I find striking is that to get out of the problem of which opinion to follow, the final statement of the סתם is to do away with the quotation of רבא instead of further grappling with the problem. Furthermore, I would be surprised that רב פפא would have been so flippant and made such a statement unless he thought it to be true. In other words, perhaps רב פפא has an explanation for following בית הלל that we don’t know about and the סתם doesn’t want us to know about for whatever reason.

Should everyone recite Birkath Hammazon?

2005-04-12T11:49:00.000-04:00

In the story that spills over from the bottom of yesterday’s daf, 42b, onto today’s daf, 43a, we find that when Rav’s students were returning from the burial of their master (לא עלינו), they did not know whether the invitation to eat bread, ניזיל וניכול לחמא בדוכתא פלניתא, without reclining, counted as קביעת סעודה. As I read the story (and I may be over-reading), they were unwilling to bentsh until they could find out whether one person should bentsh for all of them, or each man (sorry, but I’m pretty sure that they were all men) should bentsh for himself. Rav Adda bar Ahava tore his garment, already rent because of the death of Rav, as a sign of mourning for the forgetting of הלכה. Finally, an old man told them that ניזיל וניכול לחמא בדוך פלן does count as קביעת סעודה.

Clearly, this issue was of great importance to the students of Rav, which is what leads me to think that they were unwilling to bentsh until resolving this issue. This suggests that it is not merely an option for one person to bentsh out loud and all the other guests to listen and respond אָמֵן; it may very well be a חיוב גמור. Thus, the way we Ashenazzi Manhattanites bentsh may be opposed to הלכה. (I recognize that there may be people on this list who do not live in Manhattan, but what do they know? As to non-Ashkenazzim, I would be happy for them to report how they perform the ritual of ברכת המזון in the presence of company. Are there any non-Ashkenazzim out there on Reclaiming the Daf?)

I should see what גאונים and ראשונים say about this topic. Perhaps significantly, תוספות, who point out that “we” (in 12th-13th century Tzorefas) do not have הסבה, do not saying anything implying that “we” do not sit quietly and listen to one person bentsh.

Have a happy 3rd of Nisan. The tribal chieftain who offered his קרבן today was אליאב בן חילן, and I think that the first פרה אֲדֻמָּה was prepared today. (It might have been yesterday.) Of course, I do not believe in these dates as having any kind of historical reality, but they are true-- truer than true-- in the beautiful rabbinic system that we call Yiddishkeit.

Borei Nefashoth

2005-04-12T02:03:00.000-04:00

I see that there has been a slim turnout of posters today. (As far as I can tell, I am the only one who has posted in the past 24 hours.)

I just wanted to point out what many of you might have noticed or sensed, but been to scared to admit: we have been studying the laws of ברכות הנהנין for almost a week now, and all along, the assumption in the תלמוד has been that whenever one does not follow a food with the full Grace After Meals (שלש ברכות) or the abbreviated Grace (מעין שלש), one says no blessing after it. The only mention of the blessing בורא נפשות רבות was in a הוה אמינא of the Stam a few days ago, in explaining how a certain מימרא, which said that a certain sage said a blessing after a certain food, did not necessarily mean that the said sage had said שלש ברכות or מעין שלש.

Certainly, it seems that recitation of בורא נפשות after food is, at the earliest, from the very end of the Talmudic period. Is it possible that its general application to all "minor" foods entirely post-Talmudic? Are we Jews so scared of not reciting a ברכה after certain foods that we must say בורא נפשות? Or is it a positive thing: we have so much יראת שמים that we feel that we must praise the almighty המקום at every possible opportunity?

Tosofos

2005-04-11T17:05:00.000-04:00

Perhaps the following post is inappropriate for this forum, because it is of a more personal nature, and is not directly relevant to the דף. If you find this posting to be irrelevant and inappropriate for this site, comment on it thus, and I shall try to write no more posts of this kind.

And now, for the body of this e-mail: over the last few days, I have started to learn some תוספות with the דף of the day. (Until that point, I had not even been trying to learn any תוספות with the דף.) To my suprise, I have for the first time come to really love learning תוספות. Whether or not I would want to pasken like them, I find great enjoyment in learning them, and recognize their importance not only in the history of interpretation, but in the history, and interpretational sources, of הלכה.

I believe that the reason that I have come to like תוספות now is because I am understanding them much better than before. It is strange that the סוּפֶּר־בְּקִיאוּת (super-beki'us) of דף יומי could improve my skills in reading תוספות. Perhaps, it is because when I do תוספות with דף יומי, I read far more blocks of תוספות per day, even though I am spending much less time on each individual block of תוספות. (Blocks of תוספות are what Yeshivish people call “tosfosin”. I find this Yeshivish word rather silly.)

Maybe I shouldn’t spend שבת with my anti-תוספות friend who is a Rabbi in סְפָרָא אֲרִיכָא. He might divert me from the direction in which I am tending.

Mother knows best

2005-04-10T22:15:00.000-04:00

We have our second text quoting the mother of an אמורא. This time, we find the סתם using a personal account of a home-made remedy as proof for an Amoraic statement.

אמר רבי חמא ברבי חנינא: הרגיל בקצח אינו בא לידי כאב לב. מיתיבי, רבי שמעון בן גמליאל אומר: קצח - אחד מששים סמני המות הוא, והישן למזרח גרנו - דמו בראשו! לא קשיא: הא בריחו, הא בטעמו. אימיה דרבי ירמיה אפיא ליה ריפתא, ומדבקא ליה ומקלפא ליה

רבי ירמיה’s mother was careful that her son would not consume the poisonous black cumin (קצח) and would only have its taste, which seems to have helped with the pains of the heart.

Hi Everyone

2005-04-10T22:08:00.000-04:00

It's FS, here to say that we're nearing the omer count on daf days. I can't believe I've made it this far.

Benjamin the Shepherd

2005-04-10T21:52:00.000-04:00

Hey, virtual friends:

In a comment that I just made on DKP’s post “sheásani yisrael”, I promised that I would write a post on the theologico-social (or socio-theological) implication of the discussion of Benjamin the Shepherd’s bentshing.

First, a note that is probably boring to most of you. Who knows, one of you might find it interesting, so I am including it: the variant text quoted by בית יוסף in its note on אורח חיים קסז:י calls our protagonist מנימין רעיא, rather than בנימין רעיא. This is a common switch between the labials b and m, and I believe that the Talmudic name מניומי is related to the name מנימין / בנימין.

Now, I point out that our story deals with the liturgy of an untutored man. Presumably, Benjamin the Shepherd has composed this text himself. Right after we have quoted a line saying that we must say ברכות in exactly the מטבע that the Sages formulated, we find a statement quoted in which Rav says that Benjamin’s blessing is valid. (Of course, the Stam has to come along and ruin this beautiful pluralistic openness, and tell us that Benjamin hadn’t really fulfilled the obligation of the full ברכת המזון, but only the obligation of the first ברכה. What, should he then recite versions of the other three blessings, even though he has probably never heard of them? I have seen Sephardic prayerbooks that include a special abbreviated version of the four שלש ברכות, meant for women, in which the first ברכה is Benjamin’s blessing, in Aramaic, and the other three are abbreviated versions, in Hebrew, of the Sages’ blessings. What does this accomplish?)

This whole discussion raises interesting questions for us: How are we Talmudic Jews to view the untutored? Should we dumb down the Talmudic law, Artscrollize it into little books and pamphlets, and force it down the throats of the עמי ארצות (or amarotzim, in Yiddish)? Should we respect the personal prayers that they already say, and consider them to be valid alternatives to our prayers? Should we encourage them to say both their prayers and ours? In many communities, women said tkhines (תחינות), either out of their own heads or out of printed tkhines-books, in which they poured out their hearts and souls. Should we force them to give up their tkhines, and say the nineteen שמונה עשרה ברכות? Should we encourage them to continue saying only their tkhines? Should we encourage them to say both their tkhines AND our שמונה עשרה ברכות?

Certainly, we should not overburden such people with all sorts of unnecessary חוּמְרֵי (what you would call חוּמְרוֹת), which will be pointless and potentially harmful to them. Remember: nobody is obligated to say פסוקי דזמרא, or קדושתא דסדרא, or much else that is printed in our סִדּוּרִים. Half of the Jewish people (the women) are obligated to say only י"ח ברכות, and the other half (the men) is obligated to say three extra ברכות in the morning, and four extra ברכות in the evening. In addition, the men have an obligation to recite three scriptural passages (totalling no more than twenty פסוקים) in the morning and the evening.

On a personal note: today is the first day of ניסן, and therefore the first day to say the beautiful blessing on the first flowering of trees for the year. (I don't know whence Artscroll got its idea that they have to be fruit trees; this is found neither in the Bavli, nor in the Rambam, nor in the טור, nor in the שולחן ערוך. It is, however, in the Sepharadi Mahzor עוד יוסף חי for Pesah. Go figure.) This blessing is first quoted by Rav Yehuda on ברכות מ"ג, Tuesday's daf. At first, I thought: it would be cool to learn that daf in a park, and when arriving at the מימרא of Rav Yehuda, to go up to a tree and recite the מימרא, including the blessing, and to have כוונה to fulfill the blessing through the recitation of it in the learning. This would be like היה קורא בתורה והגיע זמן מקרא אם כוון לבו יצא. Then, I thought: Sure, that would be cool, but it would be making הלכה into a sort of a game. I love the beauty of the trees, and want to bless God, who created them, at the earliest possible moment. זריזין מקדימין למצוות. I called up DR (or, as DKP calls him, DLR), and we went out to Sakura Park, to say the ברכה together. Gevalt!

Sheásani Yisrael

2005-04-10T13:10:00.000-04:00

In yesterday's daf, 40b, we find a shepherd making up his own berakhah in Aramaic instead of the traditional birkat hamazon. The Stam (the anonymous layer of the Talmud) defends the use of the benediction as a fulfillment of the first berakhah of birkat hamazon. The Stam tells us that the story of the shepherd comes to teach us that he fulfilled his duty even though he recited the blessing to God in another language. The Stam then questions the novelty of this innovation, since we have already learned this principle from the Mishnah Sotah which teaches us that, among other things, prayer and birkat hamazon can be recited in any language. The Stam concludes that, nonetheless, we might have thought that prayer, birkat hamazon, etc. must be recited as exact translations of the original Hebrew, without allowing for innovation. Therefore, the story of the shepherd comes to teach us that the he fulfilled his obligation through any formulation a berakhah because he used God's name and an expression of God's kingship. Notice as well that the use of the statement "kol hameshaneh mimatbeá she'tavu hakhamim bevrakhot lo yatsa yedei hovato" appears nowhere in this sugeya, suggesting that the Stam only meant this rule might only apply to berakhot on foods.
This leads us to the following halakhic conclusion: according to the Stam of this sugeya, we might be able to change some of the content of berakhot in the context of prayer as long as we use God's name, His/Her attribute of kingship, and the word Barukh. Therefore, forgetting about the apologetics defending the "shelo asani..." format of our morning berakhot, it still stands to reason that the formulation "sheásani yisrael" or "sheásani ben chorin" expresses these apologia in a more positive and less offensive manner than "shelo asani..." Although many might still want to still retain the traditional wording of these berakhot, those who do should not claim that those who say "sheásani yisrael" are not fullfilling their obligation.

Sholosh Berokhos

2005-04-08T20:20:00.000-04:00

Haevrayya:

I have noticed that over the last few days of Gemoro, the full birkas hammozaun has been being called שלש ברכות. This is very interesting, because it suggests that the fourth berokho of birkas hammozaun, הטוב והמטיב, was not yet being recited in Amoraic times. [Alternatively, it could be merely a fixed name, just as the full tefillo is known as שמונה עשרה ברכות, in contradistinction to מעין שמונה עשרה, even though it contains nineteen berokhaus.]

As kids, we all heard the story that the fourth berokho was instituted when the harughei Veisor (הרוגי ביתר) were given burial. But how historically accurate is this, and what is its source?

Shabbetha di-shelama,
Mar Gavriel

Re: Getting involved in other's arguments

2005-04-08T20:14:00.000-04:00

Yesterday, when I sent my post "Re: Getting involved in other's arguments", blogger.com was not working very well. Therefore, I ended up not being able to send some paragraphs that I wanted to conclude that post. I am including them here.

And on a more "relevant" (כביכול) point: are you sure that Rabban Gamaliel was the host? As far as I know, Rabban Gamaliel was from Yavne, and they were dining in Jericho. Perhaps, he asked Rebbi `Aqivo to bentsh merely by virtue of being Nesi Hassanhedrin. (I admit that from a historical point of view, we are not exactly sure what the position of נשיא הסנהדרין entailed, nor even what exactly the Sanhedrin was, or how it functioned. As Barry [Wimpfheimer] once pointed out to me, it will be a hundred years from now before we shall have done enough textual work to be able to do history.)

I could also make some kind of chassidishe vort such as the following: Jericho was the place which received גמולו של א־ל, the retribution of God (by being destroyed by Joshua), and no one was supposed to oppose that retribution by rebuilding the city. That גמולו של א־ל is represented by גמליאל. The רבים, or רבנן, fight (from the expression ריב) against God’s retribution, and therefore oppose גמליאל. I can’t take myself seriously in writing this, because (at least at this stage in my life) I don’t have a head or a heart for chasidishe verter, and therefore I have felt that it would not be proper to include a name of God in my ridiculous pseudo-vort. This is why, contrary to my usual practice on this blog, I have put a hyphen in the name Eil. However, if someone with a true feeling for chasidishe verter would like to use my associations to this story in a meaningful vort, by all means, I encourage him or her.

גּוּט שַׁבָּת לְכֻלְּכוֹן,
Mar Gavriel

Watch your laughter

2005-04-08T19:30:00.000-04:00

The following exchange on today’s דף, ל"ט., provides a very valuable lesson:

נימא כתנאי, דהנהו תרי תלמידי דהוו יתבי קמיה דבר קפרא, הביאו לפניו כרוב ודורמסקין ופרגיות, נתן בר קפרא רשות לאחד מהן לברך, קפץ וברך על הפרגיות, לגלג עליו חבירו. כעס בר קפרא, אמר: לא על המברך אני כועס אלא על המלגלג אני כועס; אם חבירך דומה כמי שלא טעם טעם בשר מעולם - אתה על מה לגלגת עליו? חזר ואמר: לא על המלגלג אני כועס אלא על המברך אני כועס. ואמר: אם חכמה אין כאן, זקנה אין כאן? תנא: ושניהם לא הוציאו שנתן. מאי לאו בהא קא מיפלגי; דמברך סבר: שלקות ופרגיות שהכל נהיה בדברו, הלכך חביב עדיף; ומלגלג סבר: שלקות - בורא פרי האדמה, פרגיות - שהכל נהיה בדברו, הלכך פירא עדיף! - לא, דכולי עלמא שלקות ופרגיות שהכל נהיה בדברו, והכא בהאי סברא קא מיפלגי; מר סבר: חביב עדיף, ומר סבר: כרוב עדיף, דזיין

בר קפרא becomes angry at both of his students. The first student he is angry with is the one who laughed at his friend’s mistake. בר קפרא tells the laugher that he should have judged his colleague better and assumed the reason he began with the meat was because he was craving the bird meat. בר קפרא then turns around and shows his anger towards the one who said the blessing because he ignored the הלכה, that the cooked plums or the כרוב should have been eaten first because either food is a higher ברכה, בורא פרי אדמה. בר קפרא assumes פירא עדיף, which is the logic of the person laughing.

One lesson is that even if a person is correct, it doesn’t mean one should mock the one who is incorrect.

P.S.
Also on our דף, ל"ט:, we have רבינא relating a teaching of his mother; The family מנהג varied with the מנהג of the community:

אמר רבינא, אמרה לי אם: אבוך עביד כרבי חייא, דאמר רבי חייא: צריך שתכלה ברכה עם הפת, ורבנן עבדי כרבא. והלכתא כרבא, דאמר: מברך ואחר כך בוצע

Following tradition over logic

2005-04-08T16:05:00.000-04:00

Yesterday’s דף, ל"ח: has the following exchange.

אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן: שלקות מברכין עליהם בורא פרי האדמה, ורבי בנימין בר יפת אמר רבי יוחנן: שלקות מברכין עליהם שהכל נהיה בדברו. אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק: קבע עולא לשבשתיה כרבי בנימין בר יפת. תהי בה רבי זירא: וכי מה ענין רבי בנימין בר יפת אצל רבי חייא בר אבא? רבי חייא בר אבא - דייק וגמיר שמעתא מרבי יוחנן רביה, ורבי בנימין בר יפת - לא דייק; ועוד, רבי חייא בר אבא כל תלתין יומין מהדר תלמודיה קמיה דרבי יוחנן רביה, ורבי בנימין בר יפת לא מהדר; ועוד, בר מן דין ובר מן דין, דההוא תורמסא דשלקי ליה שבע זמנין בקדרה ואכלי ליה בקנוח סעודה, אתו ושאלו לרבי יוחנן, ואמר להו: מברכין עלויה בורא פרי האדמה; ועוד, אמר רבי חייא בר אבא: אני ראיתי את רבי יוחנן שאכל זית מליח ובריך עליו תחלה וסוף. אי אמרת בשלמא שלקות במילתייהו קיימי - בתחלה מברך עליו בורא פרי העץ ולבסוף מברך עליו ברכה אחת מעין שלש, אלא אי אמרת שלקות לאו במילתייהו קיימי, בשלמא בתחלה מברך עליו שהכל נהיה בדברו, אלא לבסוף מאי מברך? - דילמא: בורא נפשות רבות וחסרונן על כל מה שברא. מתיב רב יצחק בר שמואל: ירקות שאדם יוצא בהן ידי חובתו בפסח - יוצא בהן ובקלח שלהן, אבל לא כבושין ולא שלוקין ולא מבושלין; ואי סלקא דעתך במילתייהו קאי - שלוקין אמאי לא? - שאני התם, דבעינן טעם מרור - וליכא

The argument is a part of the discussion of which ברכה is appropriate for boiled (cooked) vegetables. According to רבי חייא בר אבא in the name of his teacher, רבי יוחנן, one should still recite בורא פרי אדמה. רבי בנימין בר יפת says the blessing should be שהכל נהיה בדברו. רבי זירא tells עולא that he shouldn’t follow רבי בנימין בר יפת for four reasons.

We follow רבי חייא בר אבא’s opinion for four reasons:
1. He learned from רבי יוחנן and was careful about what he learned
2. He reviewed what he learned from רבי יוחנן once every 30 days
3. People asked רבי יוחנן about a specific situation of cooked “vegetable.”
4. People witnessed רבי יוחנן eating salted olives, which they equate with cooked vegetables because of the change in stature of the olives from their natural state.

Without concerning ourselves with the halachic conclusion of the discussion, I find the explanation of why we follow one over the other to be quite interesting. Before this piece, we saw on our דף a couple of different discussions of how the ברכה is dependent on the communal customs, such as how people generally eat certain vegetables or how one views a food with medicinal powers. Now we are facing a situation where the social mores are ignored for the sake of more legitimate מסורה. How do we know that עולא was not choosing to say שהכל because the boiled vegetable he was eating was not something most people would eat cooked? Furthermore, how can the 4th reason, the one about salted olives, be proof?

The גמרא provides one answer, reading into the words of תחלה וסוף because of their ambiguity and never providing a resolution to which ברכות he said. Second, perhaps olives would still fall under a different category because they are one of the שבעה מינים.

The third proof is also a bit difficult because it says they cooked the food 7 times before serving it. If you are cooking something 7 times, I would be hard pressed to see it as the same item when it comes to ברכות. Unless you assume that this is still being used in its primary capacity.

Therefore, the גמרא, using רבי זירא as the debater, begins by claiming the tradition as the real reason to follow רבי חייא בר אבא. Even if רבי בנימין בר יפת might have the right סברא, tradition seems to trump סברא.

At this point, I am not sure if I would be seen as frum or not, but I do find it rather thought provoking. We look for the conceptual framework, but very often the more logical explanation might not be the right one practically.

Re: Getting involved in other's arguments

2005-04-07T20:40:00.000-04:00

Brian wondered:

>If anyone knows why this detail of where they are eating is important, please share it.

Often, places where ma`asiyyos happened, or other seemingly irrelevant details, are included. I don't have my seforim with me here, but I believe that in the story about Rabban Shim`aun b. Gamaliel, Rebbi Yehudho, and Rebbi Yosé quoted on Pesahim 101a-b (from the somewhere in the later chapters of Toseftas Berokhaus) mentions the place that they were eating. Also, the story of Rabban Gamaliel and the Zeqenim in Tosefto of `Arvei Pesahim mentions that they were dining in the house of Baithos (=Boethius) ben Zonin in Lod. And don't forget the famous story of Rebbi Eli`ezer, Yehaushua`, El`ozor b. `Azaryo, `Aqivo, and Tarfaun in Benei Veraq, which we shall read in the Haggodho in a few weeks.

I remembering hearing somewhere (either I read it in the work of a rishaun or aharaun, or I heard it mippe qodshau shellerav dovidh hallivni מפה קדשו שלרב דוד הלבני) that these details were preserved to make the stories easier to memorize.

And on a more "relevant" (כביכול) point: are you sure that Rabban Gamaliel was the host? As far as I know, Rabban Gamaliel was from Yavne, and they were dining in Jericho. Perhaps, he asked Rebbi `Aqivo to bentsh merely by virtue of being Nesi Hassanhedrin.

Ramsho Tovo (רמשא טבא)
Mar Gavriel bereih de-Rav Ashi

Getting involved in other's arguments

2005-04-07T14:16:00.000-04:00

I would like to highlight the interesting story from yesterday’s דף, ל"ז.

On ל"ז., there is a story involving רבן גמליאל and רבי עקיבא:

ומעשה ברבן גמליאל והזקנים שהיו מסובין בעלייה ביריחו, והביאו לפניהם כותבות ואכלו, ונתן רבן גמליאל רשות לרבי עקיבא לברך. קפץ וברך רבי עקיבא ברכה אחת מעין שלש. אמר ליה רבן גמליאל: עקיבא, עד מתי אתה מכניס ראשך בין המחלוקת! אמר לו: רבינו, אף על פי שאתה אומר כן וחבריך אומרים כן, למדתנו רבינו: יחיד ורבים הלכה כרבים.

Loosely translated: רבן גמליאל and the elders were eating together in an upstairs chamber in Jericho.[1] A plate of dates are brought out for the group to eat. After eating, רבן גמליאל chooses רבי עקיבא to lead the group in blessing G-d for the dates. רבי עקיבא says the ברכה מעין שלש (the abridged Grace after meals). רבן גמליאל becomes unhappy over this and says to רבי עקיבא, “Since when do you get involved in other people’s arguments (implying that רבי עקיבא was not following the custom of the host).” רבי עקיבא responds to רבן גמליאל, “Even though you say one thing (to recite the whole ברכת המזון for the 7 species of food from Israel) and the חברים (the rabbis) say something different (to say ברכה מעין שלש), we don’t follow you because we have a principle; one opinion versus the majority, the law follows the majority.

The גמרא then continues to discuss the מחלוקת between רבן גמליאל and the רבנן.

When looking at this story, I am struck by the seeming lack of respect for רבן גמליאל. He asked רבי עקיבא to lead the ברכה אחרונה. Instead of רבי עקיבא declining out of respect for רבן גמליאל, because it becomes obvious that רבי עקיבא does not follow רבן גמליאל, we see רבי עקיבא blatantly disregarding his host’s feelings.

However, רבי עקיבא’s action is consistent with following the majority. Being that the guest list at the meal included רבי עקיבא, רבן גמליאל and other elders at the meal, the majority of people at the meal did not follow רבן גמליאל’s opinion.

I guess one lesson from this is that in communal settings, a person needs to curb one’s intuition in order “keep the peace.” However, in the realm of ברכות and תפילה, when acting as an individual, it is fine to follow one’s own thinking (I would distinguish these rules from the discussion of calendar setting which we find in מסכת ראש השנה).

[1] If anyone knows why this detail of where they are eating is important, please share it.

Teyuvto de-Rav u-Shemuel teyuvto

2005-04-07T03:50:00.000-04:00

Rabbothai u-ghevirothai:

It seems that I am the first to post on this blog.

יהא רעווא מן קדם אלהא דשמייא דנצליח בסייעתיה

(I don't mind writing sheimos on the Internet, because, not being written, they are not going to be נמחקין. I might not want to write them on a website that does not show kovodh to them, but I do not feel that they would be dishonored by a Daf Yomi blog, even a pluralistic Daf Yomi blog-- nay, especially on a pluralistic Daf Yomi blog.)

On the very bottom of Berokhos 36b, two statements were reported in the name of Rav and Shemuel: 1) כל שיש בו מחמשת המינין מברכין עליו בורא מיני מזונות, and 2) כל שהוא מחמשת המינין מברכין עליו בורא מיני מזונות. Mr. Stam (i.e. the stammo di-gemoro) extrapolates from #1 that Rav and Shemuel mean to include these grains even when they are `al yedei ta`roveth (or, if you must, ta`aruves), and by #2 to rice. Mr. Stam goes on to question that Rav and Shemuel can be right. Ultimately, he quotes a boraitho (on 37a) that says when rice is ground, baked, and then boiled, one should say over it בורא מיני מזונות. Mr. Stam concludes: תיובתא דרב ושמואל תיובתא.

Yet on 37b, Rovo argues that one should say בורא מיני מזונות on any kind of rihata (apparently a kind of sweet cereal), based on statement #1 of Rav and Shemuel.

My frum teirutz of this contradiction would probably be that only statement #2 of Rav & Shemuel, which supposedly excludes rice, has been teyuvta'd by the boraiso, and that statement #1 is still available for Rovo to use as pesaq.
My akademishe explanation would be: Rav & Shemuel's statements never meant to exclude rice, so there was no reason for them to be teyuvta'd until Mr. Stam made them exclude rice and brought them into contradiction with the boraiso. For Rovo, living before the time of Mr. Stam, Rav and Shemuel's statements were both still considered valid.

תהווי ברכתא דיי עליכון

Mar Gavriel